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INTRODUcTION
On November 8, 1994, Carnegie Mellon University (CMU)
removed' a small handful of topics from among the thousands of
Usenet newsgroups2 subscribed to by the university computer sys-
tem and available on the Internet' .because they contained en-
coded sexually explicit images Under the new policy announced
by Erwin Steinberg, university vice provost for education, none of
the university's 9,000 computers would list the approximately forty
newsgroups.5 The newsgroups that were censored are all known as
"binaries,"6 and they contain, among other things, encoded imag-
1. Despite the University's restriction on the sexually explicit newsgioups, techno-
logically adept students can circumvent the policy by accessing the groups through other
file servers. However, for the purposes of this Note, the efforts of these enterprising
students are not important when compared with the symbolic effect of the censorship.
2. These newsgroups are "bulletin board-style discussion groups" that can be read
from, responded to, and downloaded to an individual's computer. See David Landis, Ex-
ploring the Online Universe, USA TODAY, Oct. 7, 1993, at 4D. The Usenet newsgroups
are available worldwide via Internet. See id.
3. The Internet is the most commonly known "wide area network" (WAN). It
"evolved from networks established by the Department of Defense and the National
Science Foundation. [The] Internet connects various government, university, and corporate
entities, spans 137 nations, and has at least fifteen million users." Eric Schlachter,
Cyberspace, the Free Market and the Free Marketplace of Ideas: Recognizing Legal Differ-
ences in Computer Bulletin Board Functions, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 87, 105
(1993) (citations omitted).
4. See Bill Schackner, CMU Bans Sex Pictures but Delays on Words, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETrE, Nov. 8, 1994, at Al. The ban originally extended to newsgroups not
containing images, but merely erotic stories and fantasies; however, university attorneys
decided the words did not violate Pennsylvania obscenity laws and the final policy did
not include the text newsgroups. See Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Censoring Cyberspace; Carnegie
Mellon's Attempt to Ban Sex from Its Campus Computer Network Sends a Chill Along
the Info Highway, TIME, Nov. 21, 1994, at 102, 103.
5. See Schackner, supra note 4, at Al.
6. "Binaries" in the title of the newsgroup indicates that it is primarily devoted to
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es, some of which are potentially "obscene" under the Supreme
Court definition of obscenity.7 Steinberg claimed that the univer-
sity's potential criminal liability under Pennsylvania's obscenity
laws motivated the decision to ban the newsgroups.8
Martin Rimm, a CMU undergraduate majoring in electrical
engineering, allegedly prompted the university's action when he
advised school officials of the preliminary results of his research
on sex and the Internet.9 Part of Rimm's research project invol-
ved downloading over 900,000 sexually explicit images from vari-
ous locations on the Internet, including the subsequently censored
Usenet newsgroups."0 University officials claimed to have been
unaware of the availability of these images prior to Rimm's re-
port." The images Rimm found ranged from typical pinup, Play-
boy-type nude photos to "dogs being raped by men [and] bound
women being raped by ski poles."'2 The notice provided by
Rimm was the stated catalyst behind CMU's action to deny access
to the images on its computer system. University attorneys told
school officials that there was "no doubt that the pictures on the
bulletin boards ... were illegal under state obscenity laws."' 3
The decision to ban the newsgroups created an uproar on the
CMU campus. 4 Calling the ban "the equivalent of closing down
a wing of the library," CMU student body president Declan
McCullagh vowed to "fight[] the urge to censor."' 5 Protesting
students staged a "Freedom in Cyberspace" rally. 6
uploaded pictures or sounds. One of the more popular groups banned by CMU is enti-
tled "alt.binaries.pictures.erotica." Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 4, at 103.
7. The Supreme Court outlined the modern three-part test for obscenity in Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). See infra Part II.
8. See Schackner, supra note 4, at Al.
9. Joshua Quittner, Life in Cyberspace; Computer Sex and the War on Fun,
NEWSDAY, Nov. 22, 1994, at 29.
10. See Todd Copilevitz, Techno-Smut on Campus; Carnegie Mellon Limits Students'
Access to Erotic Matter, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 4, 1994, at 3F. Rimm and fellow
researchers also concluded that other American users had accessed the images 6.4 million
times. See id.
11. See id.
12. George McLaren, Colleges Begin to Limit Access to Pornography on Computer
Systems, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 1, 1995, at D1 (quoting Erwin Steinberg, vice provost
for education at CMU).
13. Schackner, supra note 4, at Al.
14. See Reid Kanaley, College, Students at Odds over Access to Computer Porn,
HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Dec. 18, 1994, at A7.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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The ban also brought the university national attention from
the press; the American Civil Liberties Union; and computer activ-
ists such as Mike Godwin, an attorney with the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, and Marc Rotenberg, director of the Electronic Priva-
cy Information Center.'7 The ACLU responded with a letter to
the Faculty Senate and Student Council of CMU stating that
"[o]ut of fear that your students may be exposed to a few works
that a court might ultimately find unprotected, you have cut off
access to a large volume of protected ideas and information.""8
Attached to the letter was a memorandum outlining CMU's legal
position in any potential prosecution and concluding that criminal
liability for the university was unlikely. 9 Computer rights organi-
zations were especially concerned because of the university's posi-
tion as a worldwide leader in computer research.' CMU was an
early computer network operator and "was one of the first uni-
versities to join the Arpanet (the precursor to the Internet) and
the first to wire up its dorms.""1 Additionally, the Computer
Emergency Response Team (CERT), an elite virus-battling group,
is based at CMU. ' Thus, CMU's actions have the potential to af-
fect access to information on more than just their own computer
network.'
Because CMU is a private actor, its censorship does not pro-
vide an opportunity for judicial recourse under the First
Amendment. There is little ground for contending that a private
17. See Schackner, supra note 4, at Al; Bill Schackner, Reinstate Computer Sex Mate-
rial, ACLU Urges in Letter to CMU Head, PrITSBURGH POST-GAzETrE, Nov. 9, 1994, at
B4 [hereinafter Reinstate Computer Sex Material]; Bill Schackner, CMU Handcuffing
Cyberspace Sex; Citing State's Porn Laws, School Denies Access to Sexually Explicit Com-
puter Material, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Nov. 4, 1994, at Al.
18. Reinstate Computer Sex Material, supra note 17, at B4 (quoting letter from
ACLU).
19. See Vic Walszak & Marjorie Heins, Legal Analysis of CMU's Potential Liability
for Maintaining Sexually Explicit Bulletin Boards that Contain Obscene Material, Novem-
ber 10, 1994, available over the Internet by anonymous FTP, at FTP.EFF.ORG (Electron-
ic Frontier Foundation).
20. Schackner, supra note 4, at A4.
21. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 4, at 102.
22. See Copilevitz, supra note 10, at 3F.
23. See Bill Schackner, Pitt Committee Supports Restricting Sex on Internet, PITTS-
BURGH POST-GAZETtE, December 17, 1994, at BI (reporting that a panel of faculty,
students, and staff recommended that the University of Pittsburgh restrict access to por-
nography with a policy similar to CMU's). For now at least, the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, another high profile computing university, has indicated that it has no
intentions of following CMU's lead. See Copilevitz, supra note 10, at 3F.
11571995]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
university such as CMU cannot impose content-based restrictions
on its own computer network.' However, this does not close the
door on useful analysis of the newsgroup ban. For those opposed
to censorship of the otherwise entirely unregulated speech on the
Internet, the important issues are CMU's real motivations and the
impact of Supreme Court obscenity jurisprudence, specifically the
Miller test" and the scienter requirements announced in Smith v.
California, on traditionally protected speech when applied in the
nonphysical marketplace of ideas known as cyberspace.
This Note does not advocate the ready availability of porno-
graphic materials, nor does it attempt to defend the content of
these sexually explicit images. The First Amendment is both a
prohibition on government action and a potent statement of the
value this polity places on the freedom of speech. While some of
the images found in the censored newsgroups may be disturbing,
the First Amendment does not'limit its protections only to speech
that is soothing; though many people would not choose to receive
the information provided in these banned newsgroups, the choice
should still exist. As stated above, although it is unlikely that the
First Amendment provides legal recourse against CMU, the uni-
versity's censorship does violate the values of free speech. This
Note assesses the potential legal liabilities CMU faces for provid-
ing access to sexually explicit newsgroups, and, more importantly,
argues that examples such as CMU's (un)brave new censorship, on
balance, cost society more than they are worth. CMU's action is
already having an impact beyond the university's own computer
system. Such responses threaten to diminish the availability of
protected speech in cyberspace-the first realm where all speakers
are equal and where "identity, appearance, [and] possibly even
24. A state-supported university, by contrast, would provide the necessary state action
for a First Amendment challenge to such a content-based restriction on speech in a pub-
lic forum. There is, however, some question as to whether "cyberspace" itself is a public
forum in which free speech rights can be asserted. See Edward V. Di Lello, Functional
Equivalency and Its Application to Freedom of Speech on Computer Bulletin Boards, 26
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 199, 201 (1993) (arguing that Prodigy and other computer
networks should be "functionally equivalent to the privately owned public forums exam-
ined in Pruneyard v. Robins"). But see Edward . Naughton, Note, Is Cyberspace a Pub-
lic Forum? Computer Bulletin Boards, Free Speech, and State Action, 81 GEO. L.J. 409,
414 (1992) (examining content restrictions on the Prodigy network and concluding that
public forum doctrine should not apply to Prodigy and that "judicial intervention . . . is
currently unwarranted").
25. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
26. 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959).
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personality, [have] become unimportant."'27 Twenty-nine years
ago, Justice Potter Stewart best stated the ideal that propels these
arguments: "Censorship reflects a society's lack of confidence in
itself. It is a hallmark of an authoritarian regime. Long ago those
who wrote our First Amendment charted a different course. They
believed a society can be truly strong only when it is truly
free. ,,2
This Note begins by taking a close look at the CMU restric-
tion: the material in question, its availability, and its place in the
free speech pantheon. The CMU computer censorship debate pro-
vides a useful launching ground for analyzing the intersection
between sexually explicit images, modem computer network oper-
ation, and Supreme Court obscenity jurisprudence. The legal treat-
ment of computer-transmitted sexually explicit images brings the
forefront of technology into conflict with obscenity tests that were
formulated twenty and thirty years ago.29
Part I presents a brief primer on the Internet and delineates
precisely what part of it CMU is attempting to excise from its net-
work. What the popular media has described as "smut, men, wom-
en, animals, devices, down and dirty, in your face, oh-my-God-is-
that-what-I-think-it-is-smut,"3 is in reality mostly a lot of hot air,
bluster, and run-of-the-mill "cheesecake" and "beefcake" photo-
graphs accompanied by the occasional piece of extremely graphic
pornography. Censorship of these potentially obscene images must
be balanced against the larger First Amendment ideals embodied
by the free exchange of information on the Internet.
Part II provides a brief overview of modem obscenity doc-
trine under the First Amendment and the specific questions raised
by application of obscenity precedents to computer-transmitted
images. Obscenity prosecutions for information obtained through
cyberspace highlight two problems with the Miller obscenity test:
(1) defining the applicable "community standards" for images up-
27. Eric C. Jensen, An Electronic Soapbox: Computer Bulletin Boards and the First
Amendment, 39 FED. COMM. L. 217, 224 (1987).
28. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 498 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
29. This Note does not attempt to cover the issue of CMU's potential liability
exhaustively. For example, specific realms of liability exist for the distribution of porno-
graphic images of children and for the dissemination of obscene images to minors. While
the overall analysis presented in this Note is analogous to these other examples, there
are subtle differences at the margins that are not addressed here.
30. Copilevitz, supra note 10, at 3F.
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loaded from anywhere in the world and (2) defining the "work,
taken as a whole" for an image from a newsgroup containing
thousands of postings that are constantly changing."
Part III briefly examines the various forms of liability faced
by computer network operators for messages and images posted to
their systems, and how the different roles system administrators
play can affect their potential liability. Currently, a few commen-
tators have posited various theories on which to base system ad-
ministrator liability; most of these theories stem from analogies to
other areas of more traditional First Amendment jurisprudence."
This Part will also briefly explore Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe,
Inc.,33 the only reported decision available in the area of comput-
er system operator liability for posted material.
Part IV goes to the heart of CMU's stated explanation for
censoring the newsgroups-the notice provided by Rimm's research
project. The Supreme Court first held in Smith v. California' that
the Constitution requires some degree of scienter for obscenity
prosecutions. The Court further refined this requirement in Mish-
kin v. New York 5 and Hamling v. United States.36 Given the
vagueness of the scienter standard for obscenity prosecutions, how-
ever, the impact of CMU's "knowledge" of the sexually explicit
images in Usenet newsgroups is unclear. This Part examines this
knowledge in light of the Supreme Court's scienter rulings.
In Part V, this Note moves from the constitutional limitations
on CMU's liability for sexually explicit images on its computer
system to analyze the specific Pennsylvania obscenity statute at
issue. In addition to the reasons presented in the other Parts, this
Note concludes that CMU would not be criminally liable for any
sexually explicit image because of the specific statutory definition
31. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
32. See Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information
Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1085 (1994) [hereinafter Message in the Medi-
um]; Schlachter, supra note 3 at 116-19; David J. Loundy, E-Law: Legal Issues Affecting
Computer Information Systems and Systems Operator Liability, 3 ALB. L.J. So. & TECH.
79, 98-104 (1993); Philip H. Miller, Note, New Technology, Old Problem: Determining the
First Amendment Status of Electronic Information Services, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1147,
1190-91 (1993); Jensen, supra note 27, at 236.
33. 776 F. Supp. 135, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
34. 361 U.S. 147, 154-55 (1959).
35. 383 U.S. 502, 511 (1966).
36. 418 U.S. 87, 123 (1974).
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of "knowledge" and the specific exemption granted by the Penn-
sylvania statute itself 7
This Note concludes that CMU's fear of successful prosecution
and criminal liability is not well-founded. Regardless of whether
CMU's restriction was actually motivated by the stated fear of
prosecution or by some other content-based reason,, the result is
an unnecessary censorship of protected speech and a general chill-
ing effect on other providers of Usenet newsgroup access, particu-
larly other private universities.
I. THE INTERNET, BINARIES, NEWSGROUPS,
AND "TECHNO-SMUT" EXAMINED
The Internet was born in 1973 when the United States De-
fense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) started a
program to examine technical methods of interlinking smaller
networks so that research being conducted at multiple locations
could be better integrated. Today, the Internet includes more
than 8,000 connected networks, over 1.3 million connected comput-
ers, and over eight million users worldwide.' Among the resourc-
es and functions available on the Internet are electronic mail (e-
mail), newsgroups, "File Transfer Protocol" (FTP), software, "wide
area information servers" (WAIS), "Archie" (an indexing service),
"Gopher" (a menu system distributed worldwide that allows infor-
mation searches), and the World-Wide Web (WWW).41 Despite
common misconceptions, the Internet is not government-owned,
and it remains a generally self-regulating entity.42
The Usenet is available to computer network operators via
the Internet, and it provides the newsgroups restricted by the new
CMU policy. It includes more "than 2,000 newsgroups and more
37. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903 (1994).
38. It is possible that CMU simply did not want "techno-smut" available on its com-
puter system. See infra note 156.
39. See V. Cerf, A Brief History of the Internet and Related Networks, available via
Gopher at Internet Info.
40. See John S. Quarterman, Internet (1993) available via Gopher.
41. See id.
42. See id. Approximately 18,000 organizations "own" some part of the Internet. Id.
The Internet Activities Board (IAB), created in 1983, guides development of the Internet
and provides research to all users; it is now organized in two primary components, the
Internet Engineering Task Force and the Internet Research Task Force. See Cerf, supra
note 39.
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than 2 million users."'43 Among these thousands of forums, the
"alt." (as in alternative) newsgroups tend to be a little more "free-
form."44 Users accessing newsgroups are presented with a list of
postings. These postings are messages sent to the group from any
user with an Internet connection worldwide. On the various news-
groups, the postings range from one discussion to another, and
topics are known as "threads." New users of the newsgroups, re-
ferred to somewhat condescendingly as "newbies," are often di-
rected to the "Frequently Asked Questions" file (FAQ), so as not
to waste other readers' time and "bandwidth" with repetitive ques-
tions or topics. Users who post messages that are off-topic, already
covered in the FAQ, insulting or argumentative often receive
anywhere from one to thousands of negative replies (known as
"flames"). "Flame wars" can rage out of control on a newsgroup
when a particularly disruptive message is posted or when two sides
go back and forth on an issue. Among all the Usenet newsgroups,
there is one constant-the continuous rollover of messages as new
ones are posted and old ones are deleted. Postings to the news-
groups are only temporary, with most postings having lives of any-
where from a day to a week, depending on the volume of postings
mailed to the group. In this manner, the newsgroups attempt to
keep discussion flowing and tend to maintain a sense of rough
justice among themselves.
These newsgroups, along with other computer bulletin boards
and services available on the Internet, "provide a significant new
channel of communication."'45 In 1919, long before the birth of
cyberspace, Justice Oliver W. Holmes wrote that "the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market."46 This ideal underlies much of what
has been stated and held by the Supreme Court in applying the
First Amendment's protection of the freedom of speech. The In-
ternet, with its multitude of newsgroups, nodes, and users, "indi-
43. Quarterman, supra note 40. A USA Today article on the Internet provided a
random list of some Usenet newsgroups: "misc.forsale[,] misc.jobs.offered[,] rec.food.cook-
ing[,] rec.arts.startrek.info[,] sci.psychology sci.space[,] soc.culture.african.american[,] soc.-
feminism[,] talk.politics.drugs[,] ... alt.fan.dave..barry[,] alt.sex.fetishes[,] alt.rock-n-
roll.metal[,] alt.tasteless[,] alt.supermodels [and] alt.tv.ren-n-stimpy . . . ." Landis, supra
note 2, at 4D.
44. Landis, supra note 2, at 4D.
45. Jensen, supra note 27, at 217.
46. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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cate[s] that the goal of a free market in the supply of communica-
tions has been better achieved with [computer communications]
than in [more traditional methods such as] newspaper[s] or broad-
casting . . . ."' With such unregulated communications come the
same risks that have always co-existed with free speech.
Unsurprisingly, among the thousands of newsgroups on the
Usenet, several are devoted to sexual topics. Indeed, wherever
people go in the future in cyberspace or real space, it is unlikely
that this topic will ever be eliminated.' A 1994 USA Today arti-
cle reported that one "monthly compilation of the most trafficked
Usenet newsgroups ... shows that three of the top 10 are sex-re-
lated: alt.sex.stories, alt.binaries.pictures.erotica and alt.sex. Each
had more than 200,000 readers last month; in some months, read-
ership has topped 400,000." 4' However, the discussions going on
in these sexually oriented newsgroups cannot all be cavalierly dis-
missed as "techno-smut."' These newsgroups also include several
threads involving safe sex, responsible sexual conduct,51 tolerance
for homosexuality, racial tolerance, and equality between the sex-
es.
Moreover, the line drawn by the CMU policy between news-
groups like alt.sex and alt.binaries.pictures.erotica on the basis of
potential obscenity prosecutions is artificial, ignoring the reality of
the contents of these newsgroups. Alt.binaries.pictures.erotica was
restricted by CMU because of the sexually explicit images that it
contained, as opposed to the mere words in newsgroups such as
alt.sex 2 However, even binaries newsgroups are not quite what a
novice user might expect; accessing a binary newsgroup does not
bring a flood of sexually explicit pictures across the monitor. To
47. Jensen, supra note 27, at 222.
48. Interest in sexually explicit materials has not only spawned increased accessing of
Usenet newsgroups but has also been linked to the "growth of the consumer VCR mar-
ket." See Mike Godwin, Sex and the Single Sysadmin: The Risks of Carrying... Graphic
Sexual Materials, INTERNET WORLD, March/April 1994, at 56, 57. Moreover, "sexually
oriented CD-ROM programs are believed by many to be a hidden factor propelling sales
of computers and video game systems." David Landis, Sex, Laws & Cyberspace Regulat-
ing Porn: Does It Compute?, USA TODAY, Aug.l 9, 1994, at 1D, 2D.
49. See Landis, supra note 48, at 1D. Of these three, alt.binaries.pictures.erotica is
among those banned by CMU. The university originally planned to ban the other two,
but then recanted because they usually contain only words and no pictures. See Elmer-
Dewitt, supra note 4, at 103.
50. See Copilevitz, supra note 10, at 3F.
51. See Reinstate Computer Sex Material, supra note 17, at B4.
52. See Schackner, supra note 4, at Al.
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begin with, the binaries newsgroups sometimes contain almost as
many text messages as they do uploaded images.53 Typically, the
text posts on binary newsgroups include requests for certain pic-
tures or subjects, comments on previous postings, and more gener-
al comments on the newsgroup topic, whether the topic is pictures
of erotica or pictures of furniture.'
The images themselves are usually denoted by filenames end-
ing in either a ".jpg," ".mpg" or ".gif" suffix indicating which
graphic format was used to create the image. However, directing
the computer to read a posted image will fill the screen with gib-
berish. The reason for this seeming nonsense is the limitation on
the number of characters (about 90) available on the Internet to
depict the colors of pixels in computer pictures; to accommodate
these limitations, pictures are "uuencoded" and often broken up
into chunks of less than 64 kilobytes.55 So, to view these images,
three steps are necessary: (1) the uuencoded image must be down-
loaded to a computer; (2) the uuencoded image must be decoded
using a separate application; and finally, (3) the decoded image
can be viewed using yet another program. Many of these images,
moreover, cannot even be printed after viewing because they do
not contain enough detail.56 Thus, the reality of the "techno-
smut" banned by CMU is not quite as blatantly "sexy" as the
press or the university officials make it out to be. Moreover, the
necessity of taking these steps means that no user will inadver-
tently view one of these images while accessing a Usenet news-
group.
The newsgroups contain a tremendous amount of information,
both text and uuencoded images, including some very hard-core
pornography that would almost certainly be obscene under the
Miller test in most communities and even some child pornography
that would be illegal regardless of its relative obscenity. But
53. One of the banned newsgroups, alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.d, while a "binary"
group by name, is actually meant to be entirely discussion (as denoted by the "d").
54. Text posts on binary groups are often followed by complaints (in the form of a
text message) from disgruntled users about how this is a binary newsgroup and that text
messages should not be posted to it.
55. See Scott Hagie, How to Decode Pics FAQ, available over the Internet, by anon-
ymous FTP, at FrP.NETCOM.COM.
56. See Copilevitz, supra note 10, at 3F.
57. In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-58 (1982), the Supreme Court held
that any pornographic depictions involving children could be restricted on the basis of
protecting children from exploitation and abuse.
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removing these potentially illegal images from the newsgroups
offered by CMU's computer system also requires removing a great
deal of traditionally protected speech. By enacting such a policy,
CMU has cast itself as the arbiter of what speech will be allowed
and what will not. System operators such as CMU do face the di-
lemma of determining how to separate the obscenity from the pro-
tected speech while "[p]ostings to newsgroups ... flood in over
the electronic transom 24 hours a day.,58 CMU, however, chose
to try to solve the dilemma by censoring altogether the sexually
oriented binaries newsgroups. The CMU response overreacts to
the perceived threat of possible prosecution. More importantly
from the university's perspective, the new policy does not elimi-
nate the risks of potentially obscene images or child pornography
on the CMU system. 9 In fact, no policy, short of individually
reviewing every message posted to a computer system, can com-
pletely eliminate the risk of the presence of some "obscene" imag-
es.
60
University officials responsible for the new policy based their
decision on the notice provided by Martin Rimm's research.
Notice of the presence of the images prompted the university to
restrict the newsgroups, because in any subsequent prosecution,
the school could no longer claim a lack of scienter.62 Under Su-
preme Court obscenity doctrine, prosecutions cannot b6 based on
strict liability, but rather require some degree of scienter. 3 Al-
though the CMU policy restricts otherwise protected speech,' if
58. John Schwartz, School Gives Computer Sex the Book" Carnegie Mellon University
Taking Discussion Groups Off Its Network, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1994, at A26.
59. See Godwin, supra note 48, at 61 (noting that "it's always possible for someone
to post illegal material to an innocuous newsgroup .. . so that it would get to your
system anyway"); Message in the Medium, supra note 32, at 1095-96 ("Regardless of the
appropriateness of content-based regulations, significant problems will arise in their actual
implementation .... In the end, the role of content-based regulations in theory may be
irrelevant if such regulations will be unenforceable in practice.").
60. See Godwin, supra note 48, at 61. Additionally, the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 18 U.S.C.), protects an individual's e-mail from inspection without con-
sent, thereby leaving a gaping hole in any system operator's attempt to censor sexually
explicit images entirely. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2711 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 9-13.
62. See Schwartz, supra note 58, at A26.
63. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-54 (1959) (holding that a California
statute imposing strict liability on sellers of obscene materials was unconstitutional); see
also infra Part IV.
64. Regardless of the protected nature of such speech, there can be no First Amend-
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at least one of the images of which the university received notice
is later deemed "obscene" or found to contain child pornography,
then the university's knowledge of these contents seems to justify
the new restrictions. However, this justification is founded on two
assumptions: (1) that the images can be proven obscene and (2)
that the notice received by the university provides sufficient scien-
ter for prosecution. These two issues are addressed below in Parts
II and III.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT, OBSCENITY, AND THE INTERNET
The Supreme Court has seen fit to orphan "obscene" expres-
sion from the realm of First Amendment protections.' In Miller
v. California, the Supreme Court formulated a three-part test for
obscenity that requires examining
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary communi-
ty standards would find that the work, taken as a whole appeals
to the prurient interest ... ; (b) whether the work depicts or de-
scribes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable law; and (c) whether the work, taken
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value."
Applying this test to on-line sexually explicit images creates two
primary difficulties. First, it is unclear what the community stan-
dard test means when applied to a nonphysical community. Sec-
ond, it is unclear what information on the Internet would be de-
fined as the "work" in question.
A. "Community Standards" Applied to the Internet
Computer images contained in Usenet newsgroups can origi-
nate from any user in the country (and even the world) who has
access to a computer on the Internet. In obscenity trials not in-
volving computer-transmitted images, the question of what "com-
ment claim brought by computer users at CMU since the university is not a state actor.
See supra note 24.
65. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
66. Id. at 25. This modern test modified the previous test from A Book Named John
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), by re-
fusing to "adopt as a constitutional standard the 'utterly without redeeming social value'"
language from Memoirs. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25 (quoting Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 419).
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munity standards" apply has been left intentionally vague under
Supreme Court doctrine.' In Jenkins v. Georgia, the Supreme
Court reversed a Georgia jury's finding that the film Carnal
Knowledge was "obscene". The Court, however, went on to hold
that
[w]hat Miller makes clear is that state juries need not be instruct-
ed to apply "national standards." We ... agree with the Su-
preme Court of Georgia's implicit approval of the trial court's
instructions directing jurors to apply "community standards"
without specifying what "community." Miller held that it was con-
stitutionally permissible to permit juries to rely on the under-
standing of the community from which they came as to contem-
porary community standards, and the States have considerable
latitude in framing statutes under this element of the Miller deci-
sion. A State may choose to define an obscenity offense in terms
of "contemporary community standards" as defined in Miller
without further specification... or it may choose to define the
standards in more precise geographic terms . . ..
Thus, "community standards" are left to the jurors to define in
whatever way each juror chooses. This creates a situation where
prosecutors shop for conservative venues in which to bring obscen-
ity cases, so that the make-up of the jury will increase the likeli-
hood of application of a conservative community standard. 9
Under "traditional" means of transferring pornography, dis-
tributors can purposefully avoid shipping sexually explicit books,
magazines, and videos to communities where they feel they are
likely to face prosecution.7" Persons in contact with the sexually
explicit images have some degree of control over their exposure to
potential prosecution, even with the vague "community standards"
language of the Miller test. However, applying the traditional com-
munity standards test to computer-transmitted images effectively
renders that part of the test meaningless.
67. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974).
68. Id.
69. This strategy was demonstrated in the Amateur Action Bulletin Board case. See
infra text accompanying notes 70-78. The materials available on the board were confiscat-
ed by California law enforcement officials two years prior to the Tennessee case; howev-
er, prosecutors did not bring an indictment because the materials did not violate commu-
nity standards.
70. See Landis, supra note 48, at 1D.
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The first successful prosecution for computer-transmitted imag-
es resulted in convictions for Robert and Carleen Thomas of Mil-
pitas, California. On December 2, 1994, they were sentenced to 37
and 30 months in prison, respectively, for interstate transmission of
obscene images to an undercover agent in Tennessee." The
Thomases were operators of the members-only Amateur Action
Bulletin Board System, a commercial bulletin board specifically
devoted to sexual topics.' The computer images transmitted by
the Thomases' bulletin board "depicted bestiality, torture, defeca-
tion, self-mutilation and rape."'73 The Thomhases argued that com-
munity standards in Memphis, Tennessee should not be applied to
images that were possessed in California; however, U.S. District
Judge Julia Gibbons refused to allow the jury to hear this argu-
ment.74 The decision is currently on appeal, and some commenta-
tors believe that it will not be completely resolved until the Su-
preme Court decides how the obscenity test should be applied to
computer-transmitted material.7' The result in the case has left
computer system operators everywhere with fear of prosecution76
and may have contributed to CMU's hasty ban of the binaries
newsgroups.
The decision in the Thomases' case continues to use the vague
approach to the community standards test found in Jenkins v.
Georgia' while indicating that at least one federal judge is willing
to ignore the differences that the new technology of computer
bulletin boards brings to the obscenity question. In Miller, the Su-
preme Court originally based its rejection of a national standard
for obscenity on the holding that the Constitution and the First
Amendment do not require courts to ignore the fact that "[p]eople
in different States vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this diver-
sity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformi-
ty."' In contrast, the logical extension of the decision in the
71. See Computer Porn Nets Prison Terms, RocKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Dec. 3, 1994,
at 46A; Landis, supra note 48, at 1D.
72. See Chris Conley, California Couple Get Prison for Computer Porn Relayed Here,
THE COM. APPEAL (Memphis), Dec. 3, 1994, at 1A; Computer Porn Nets Prison Terms,
supra note 71, at 46A.
73. Conley, supra note 72, at 1A.
74. See Computer Porn Nets Prison Terms, supra note 71, at 46A.
75. See Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 4, at 102.
76. See Landis, supra note 48, at 1D.
77. 418 U.S. 153 (1974); see supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
78. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973).
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Thomases decision means that for computer system operators, the
community standard is effectively whatever holds true in the most
conservative jurisdiction with a phone line and a computer. This
reasoning flies directly in the face of the Miller Court's refusal to
adopt a national standard; the fate of this decision lies in the
hands of the court of appeals and possibly the Supreme Court.79
B. Defining "The Work, Taken as a Whole" in Terms of Usenet
Newsgroups
Upon receiving notice from Martin Rimm that the CMU
computer system was home to some potentially obscene images,
William Arm, CMU's vice president for computer services, and
Erwin Steinberg, vice provost for education, did some investigating
of their own to determine the nature of the sexually explicit
groups; they found several shocking examples of hard-core pornog-
raphy.' The university promptly banished the newsgroups that
contained these images because it feared criminal prosecution
under Pennsylvania obscenity law." For such a prosecution to be
successful under the Miller test, the images would have to be ex-
amined in context because Miller requires that the "work, taken as
a whole," be tested.' Thus, one potentially dispositive question in
assessing the obscenity of a given image available on a Usenet
newsgroup becomes the definition of the "work."
Defining the "work" in the Internet context, however, is diffi-
cult. Usenet newsgroups to which CMU provides access come as a
package containing thousands of constantly changing postings, the
majority of which are unlikely to be deemed obscene. CMU's
computer system does not provide obscene sexually explicit images
as such but does so only inadvertently as a result of providing
access to the Usenet newsgroups. Unlike the Thomases' operation
of Amateur Action Bulletin Board System,' CMU does not sin-
gle out any specific images and offer them to users.' Moreover,
79. However, the prosecution of the Thomases does not provide any justification for
CMU's censorship. See infra p. 1178.
80. See Schwartz, supra note 58, at A26; McLaren, supra note 12, at D1.
81. See supra Part I.
82. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24; supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 71-79.
84. This distinction places the Thomases and CMU on different points on the
"sliding scale of control and access" between primary publishers, secondary publishers,
and common carriers; these different levels of control account for their different levels of
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because of the ephemeral nature of newsgroup postings, CMU's
(and any other Usenet-carrying system administrator's) knowledge
of the sexually explicit content of these images only exists in the
most general way and can be easily circumvented by posting sexu-
al material in off-topic newsgroupsY The only place on CMU's
computer system where actual, decoded, sexually explicit images
will be found is in the personal files of individual users, the con-
tent of which CMU has no knowledge or control over.'
In a hypothetical prosecution of CMU for possession or distri-
bution of obscene material via its computer system, logically, the
"work" in question to be "taken as a whole" should be the Usenet
newsgroup from which the image in question came. The news-
group is the unit of information that the university deals with
when it decides to provide access; Rimm's research put the univer-
sity on notice as to the content of these newsgroups, and the bina-
ries newsgroups are the "works" that CMU chose to censor. Un-
der the Miller test, the purveyor or distributor of a movie that
contained one five-minute, sexually explicit scene in two hours of
film would not be liable because, taken in context, the movie
would be unlikely to (a) appeal to the "prurient interest" or (b)
"lack[] serious ... artistic ... value."' Moreover, this third part
of the Miller test is based on a reasonable man standard that does
not vary from community to community.' Similarly, an obscenity
prosecution against CMU for possession or distribution of an ob-
scene image or images in one of the newsgroups on its system
should require the trier of fact to place the image(s) in the context
of the entire newsgroup in question. Only then would the state's
interest in prohibiting obscenity be balanced against the cost, mea-
sured in terms of protected speech that would be chilled or lost.
Such an approach would also insure that the First Amendment
would continue to protect "works which, taken as a whole, have
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, regardless of
liability. See Schlachter, supra note 3, at 116-19; infra Part III.
85. Rimm's study alerted the university to which newsgroups may tend to contain
images likely to be found obscene. But without screening every posting for content, the
university cannot be said to "know" what each group contains at any given moment.
86. See Godwin, supra note 48, at 60 (citing the protections guaranteed by the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act).
87. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
88. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 497 (1987) (holding jury instructions allowing ap-
plication of community standards to the "value" of the work in question unconstitution-
al).
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whether the government or a majority of the people approve of
the ideas these works represent." 9
A prosecutor assigned to the hypothetical obscenity case
against CMU would likely argue that the image standing alone
should be the work taken as a whole. However, prosecuting a
system operator such as CMU under such a theory would seem to
implicate the Supreme Court's holding in Stanley v. Georgia,"
which protected sexually explicit material in a zone of privacy. 9
The Stanley Court held "that the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments prohibit making mere private possession of obscene material
a crime."'  In the hypothetical CMU prosecution, the Stanley
holding implies that a prosecution based on the sexually explicit
image alone would be prohibited because the only place these
images exist in that context is in the personal files of CMU com-
puter users.'
Neither of the questions regarding the Miller test as applied to
computer system operators have been raised in anything other
than a hypothetical manner. If the Thomases' case makes it to the
Supreme Court, there may then be a refinement of the "communi-
ty standards" test. The very instability of this area of jurispru-
dence, however, should not frighten CMU officials into an ill-con-
ceived policy that reduces the amount of free speech available in
the marketplace of ideas. Rather, the lack of certainty of such a
prosecution should encourage the university to stay the course as a
world leader in use of the Internet. Furthermore, even if an image
found on CMU's computer system were deemed obscene, it would
89. Miller, 413 U.S. at 34. Jim Brown, Dean of the School of Journalism at Indiana
University-Purdue University at Indianapolis, echoed these thoughts in response to CMU's
decision to censor its computer system: "There's some really gross stuff out there, by
most people's standards. It makes you wonder about the mentality of some people ...
[, but a]s an academic, I recognize that my trash is another person's research materi-
al . . . ." McLaren, supra note 12, at D1.
90. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
91. Id. at 566 (holding that "[w]hatever the power of the state to control public
dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise
legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts").
92. Id. at 568.
93. Although Jenkins has never been applied to the private possession of computer
files, the difference in technology between film and computer disk or memory would not
appear to be dispositive in such a case.
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still be extremely unlikely that the university would face criminal
liability.94
III. DIFFERING DEGREES OF LIABILITY FOR
SYSTEM ADMINISTRATORS
Previous analysis of system administrator liability for the ac-
tions or statements of others posted on computer networks has
been largely confined to liability for traditional tort actions such as
defamation or libel.95 These examinations of vicarious liability for
postings by those other than the system operator have generally
proceeded by analogizing the role of the system administrator to
that of more traditional First Amendment actors. Because comput-
er networks offer "a number of communication options[,] . . . one
analogy is insufficient."' Network operators face a "sliding scale"
of analogous roles running from primary publisher to secondary
publisher to common carrier.' To determine CMU's potential lia-
bility, it is necessary to examine first where the university falls on
this scale of computer system operators.
As primary publishers, system administrators have rights and
responsibilities similar to other, more traditional media outlets.9"
The Supreme Court established the extent of such a publisher's
liability for defamation in New York Times v. Sullivan" when it
held that plaintiffs must show actual malice to recover."° Second-
ary publishers differ in that they do not have editorial control over
content; such publishers generally cannot be held liable for the
defamatory (or obscene) nature of the material they publish.10 1
Third, "common carriers[] such as telephone companies ... and
other non-content providers ... also lack substantial editorial
94. See infra Parts III, IV, and V.
95. See Schlachter, supra note 3, at 116-19; Jensen, supra note 27, at 243-52.
96. Loundy, supra note 32, at 89.
97. See Schlachter, supra note 3, at 116-19; see also Loundy, supra note 32, at 88-89.
98. See Jensen, supra note 27, at 243-44 (citing Legi-Tech, Inc. v. Keiper, 766 F.2d
728 (2d Cir. 1985), in support of the proposition that in some circumstances computer
network operators should be treated as media outlets with the same rights and liabilities
under the First Amendment).
99. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
100. Id. at 279-80.
101. See Schlachter, supra note 3, at 115-16, 118 (stating that secondary publishers
will be held liable only if they "knew or had reason to know of the existence of defama-
tory material").
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control and generally are considered immune from liability for the
statements of others .... "102
In addition to the scale of roles of system administrators,
different computer network operations entail another set of analo-
gies that may also result in different levels of potential liability. °
Message posting-such as to Usenet newsgroups, e-mail, real-time
interaction among multiple users, information resources and data-
bases, software dissemination, and gateways to other systems-are
all different functions that computer networks can provide to us-
ers. 4 By combining the scales of type of function and type of
control, one commentator has suggested that system operators
"can choose the level of knowledge and control they want, with
the concomitant rights and responsibilities."' 5 The Prodigy net-
work is a good example of this choice in the real world."m Prodi-
gy, which has over one million users and claims to be the largest
of the commercial bulletin board services," bills itself as the
"Disney Channel" of computer networks1 08 and "states that it is
responsible for its users' messages and therefore has the rights of a
print publisher not to print every message submitted."' "m By tak-
ing this position, Prodigy takes on the responsibility for all publicly
posted messages on its system and assumes any potential liability
stemming from such messages."
CompuServe, another of the commercial bulletin board servic-
es, takes a different approach to its responsibilities as a network
operator: it removes messages only after complaints from other
users."1 CompuServe was a defendant in Cubby, Inc. v. Compu-
Serve, Inc.," currently the only federal case against a bulletin
board operator based on the content of third party postings. In
Cubby, the plaintiffs brought suit against CompuServe for libel,
102. Id. at 119.
103. See &L at 129-47.
104. See id. at 108-10.
105. Id. at 147.
106. See Naughton, supra note 24, at 409-12.
107. Landis, supra note 2, at 4D.
108. Schlachter, supra note 3, at 102 n.53.
109. Id. at 136. Prodigy prescreens submitted messages by using an automated pro-
gram that searches for key words. See id. at 102 n.54.
110. See id. at 137.
111. Id. at 136.
112. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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business disparagement, and unfair competition."3 The statements
that prompted the suit were made in the "Journalism Forum," one
of many such forums offered by CompuServe."4 CompuServe
contracts out to various suppliers for the information contained in
these forums, and in this particular case, the contract between
CompuServe Information Services and Cameron Communications,
Inc. (CCI) gave exclusive rights to "'manage, review, create, de-
lete, edit and otherwise control the contents' of the Journalism
Forum 'in accordance with editorial and technical standards and
conventions of style as established by CompuServe.' ' .5 The
court granted CompuServe's motion for summary judgment in the
case and held that CompuServe was merely a "distributor" of in-
formation, and as such could not be held liable for defamatory
statements absent a showing that it knew or had reason to know
of the defamation. 6
CMU's role in providing access to Usenet newsgroups under
this type of analysis indicates that CMU would likely be held to
be a "mere distributor" of the information on the newsgroups. The
system operators at CMU do not exercise any editorial control
over the individual postings in the Usenet newsgroups nor does
the university explicitly claim any responsibility for the contents of
those postings. As a distributor, CMU's tort and criminal liability
for the contents of these newsgroups is limited only to the materi-
al about which CMU knew or had reason to know. This scienter
standard is at the root of CMU's explanation of its censorship of
the newsgroups. However, as explained in Part I, CMU did not
actually have knowledge of any particular sexually explicit image;
it only knew that some newsgroups had contained potentially ob-
scene images in the past. To determine fully whether CMU's
knowledge (or lack thereof) warrants its stated fear of prosecution
requires an examination of the Supreme Court's scienter standard
for obscenity prosecutions.
113. See id. at 137.
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 139 (citing Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 235
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)). In granting the motion, Judge Leisure made reference to Smith v. Cali-
fornia, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), in support of the knowledge requirement for the defamation
cause of action. See id at 139. The Smith decision and an application of its scienter
requirements in obscenity prosecutions are covered fully in Part IV.
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IV. THE SMITH SCIENTER REQUIREMENT AND
OBSCENITY PROSECUTIONS
A successful obscenity prosecution requires first that the
material in question be proven to be obscene under the Miller
test.n7 At common law, all criminal prosecutions required proof
of some degree of mens rea."' However, defendants in obscenity
prosecutions may not raise as a defense the lack of knowledge
that the material in question was "obscene" according to commu-
nity standards under the Miller test."9 This chilling effect on ma-
terial at the margin of obscenity was lifted somewhat by the Su-
preme Court in 1959 in Smith v. California.1"
In Smith, a bookseller in Los Angeles was convicted for vio-
lating a municipal ordinance "which [made] it unlawful 'for any
person to have in his possession any obscene or indecent writing,
[or] book.., in any place of business where ... books ... are
sold or kept for sale.' '' . Since the definition of the offense in
the ordinance did not include any requirement that the person
charged have any knowledge of the contents of the book or mate-
rial, the Court construed the ordinance as imposing "strict" liabili-
ty.1' The Court held that the imposition of strict liability by the
lack of a scienter requirement in the ordinance "would tend seri-
ously to have [the effect of restricting the dissemination of books
that are not obscene], by penalizing booksellers, even though they
had not the slightest notice of the character of the books they
sold."" This chilling effect on booksellers caused by the ordi-
nance would then tend "to impose a severe limitation on the pub-
117. See supra Part II.
118. See Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1797 (1994). In Staples, Justice
Thomas restated the oft-quoted line from Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500
(1951): "The existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the
principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence." Id.
119. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 123-24 (1974) (holding that the gov-
ernment does not have to prove defendant's knowledge of the "legal status" of the mate-
rial in question); see also WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT 676-77 (1991)
(noting that "[s]ince so much rides on the right guess respecting the nonobscenity of the
material in question, one's uncertainty may per se produce a large chilling effect").
120. 361 U.S. 147 (1959); see VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 119, at 677.
121. Smith, 361 U.S. at 148 (alteration in original) (quoting § 41.01.1 of the Municipal
Code of the City of Los Angeles).
122. See id.
123. Id. at 152.
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lie's access to constitutionally protected matter."124 Thus, the
Court held that obscenity laws must have some scienter ele-
ment;"z however, in an additional dictum the Court stated that
they "need not and most definitely do not pass today on what sort
of mental element is requisite to a constitutionally permissible
prosecution of a bookseller for carrying an obscene book in
stock. ,2126
The Supreme Court later refined the level of scienter neces-
sary for a constitutionally permissible obscenity prosecution in
Mishkin v. New York 27 and Hamling v. United States.'2 In
Mishkin, the Court upheld a conviction under a New York state
obscenity law that was interpreted as requiring that the defendant
be "aware of the character of the material.' ' 29 In Hamling, the
Court held that "[i]t is constitutionally sufficient that the prosecu-
tion show that a defendant had knowledge of the contents of the
materials he distributed, and that he knew the character and nature
of the materials."'" The Court did not offer any elaboration of
the meaning of these phrases or their potential application.'
The Court also held that the prosecution did not have to prove
that the defendants knew of the "obscene character of the materi-
al.2132
Applying only this scienter standard to CMU's knowledge of
the contents of the censored Usenet newsgroups does not yield
absolutely clear answers.133 At one extreme, CMU clearly would
have the constitutionally necessary scienter in a prosecution involv-
ing one of the specific images pointed out by Rimm to university
officials. At the other extreme, the university clearly could not be
constitutionally held liable for an obscene image found posted off-
topic in a newsgroup such as rec.sports.basketball.college. The
124. Id. at 153.
125. Id. at 154-55.
126. Id. at 154; see also Jensen, supra note 27, at 248-49.
127. 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
128. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
129. Mishkin, 383 U.S. at 510-11. See Recent Development, Federal Child Pornogra-
phy Law's Scienter Requirement-United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 28 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 585, 590 (1993).
130. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 123 (emphasis added).
131. Recent Development, supra note 129, at 590.
132. See Hamling, 418 U.S. at 120.
133. The uncertainties expressed in various parts of this Note are not cumulative, i.e.,
they do not total up to imply a reasonable fear of prosecution for CMU.
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reality of the situation is somewhere in between: CMU knows, as
do all system operators, that at any one time it is likely that some
of the Usenet binaries newsgroups contain sexually explicit images
that are potentially obscene."4
In Smith, the defendant was a bookseller operating a small
bookshop, and the Supreme Court's decision reflected a recogni-
tion of the limitations that the defendant faced in knowing the
contents of his stock; this factual situation has been compared to
that of the small computer bulletin board operator.3 The posi-
tions of the two parties are roughly equivalent in terms of their
ability to monitor the contents of the material they offer.136 Us-
ing this sort of comparison as an example, one commentator has
argued unpersuasively that the Supreme Court's vague "con-
structive" knowledge requirement for obscenity prosecutions strikes
the proper balance between protecting free speech and protecting
society.37
In contrast to the small bulletin board operator, CMU's net-
work comprises over 9,000 computers with access to thousands of
Usenet newsgroups, thousands of FTP servers worldwide, and
millions of computer users through e-mail. Permitting prosecutors
to use a constructive knowledge standard against such a computer
operator renders the stated goals of the Smith standard meaning-
less. To say that "[w]hile the operator should not be found liable
for occasional acts of users, proof that a board is consistently used
for illegal activities should be sufficient to impose liability" '138 is
to ignore the very dangers of chilling protected speech of which
the Court warned in Smith.39 However, other more contempo-
rary commentators have argued that, for the purposes of liability,
system operators should not be deemed to have "'knowledge' un-
less they have actual knowledge . . . ."" Under an "actual knowl-
134. See supra Part I.
135. See Jensen, supra note 27, at 248.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 249. The assumptions that Jensen made in 1987 about the ability of
system operators to monitor content are somewhat outdated given the rapid expansion of
commercial networks and the explosive growth of the Internet over the past eight years.
Currently, a system administrator such as CMU faces a tremendously greater burden than
the average bookseller in terms of the amount of material that potentially might have to
be monitored.
138. Id.
139. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-54 (1959).
140. Schlachter, supra note 3, at 134 (emphasis added); see also Loundy, supra note
11771995]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
edge" standard, CMU would be liable only for those sexually ex-
plicit images of which it had actual notice-namely those images
found by Rimm and shown to university officials.
Any prosecution of CMU for obscene images on its computer
network most likely would be decided under the Hamling scienter
standard. No Supreme Court or circuit court precedent exists in-
volving the imposition of tort or criminal liability on a computer
system operator. The two recent lower court cases examined
above, Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. and the Thomases deci-
sion, however, do provide CMU with avenues of defense against
such a prosecution.'41 Following the line of reasoning applied in
Cubby, CMU should not be liable for the contents of any Usenet
newsgroup because it is merely distributing those newsgroups as a
whole; computer networks that subscribe to the Usenet generally
do not exercise any editorial control over the content of the indi-
vidual newsgroups."
The Thomases decision should also provide CMU with legal
arguments against liability for obscene images because the
Thomases' position can be readily distinguished from CMU's.
Through their Amateur Action Bulletin Board System, the
Thomases were actively engaged in the business of transmitting
pornography to subscribers. The role that the Thomases played as
system operators was much closer to that of a primary publisher as
opposed to CMU's position as a mere distributor. Thus, the
Thomases' potential liability far outstrips that of the university,
and the Thomases' case would provide a useful contrast for CMU
in any hypothetical prosecution.
Thus far, this Note has examined the constitutional issues
involved in CMU's potential liability under obscenity law without
focusing on the specifics of Pennsylvania's obscenity statute. This
approach has been used to provide a generally applicable analysis
of computer network operator liability for sexually explicit images
and to assess the reasonableness of the university's expressed fear.
Overall, this Note is concerned more with the broader ramifica-
tions of CMU's actions than with delving into the minutiae of
32, at 138-40.
141. For discussion of Cubby, see supra text accompanying notes 111-16; for discus-
sion of the Thomases decision, see supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
142. Ironically, the censorship of the binaries newsgroups may actually diminish the
force of this argument since CMU is clearly attempting to take control of some content,
albeit in a very clumsy and heavy-handed way.
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Pennsylvania obscenity law. However, certain specific sections of
the Pennsylvania statute further undermine CMU's stated fear and
may provide other similarly situated computer system administra-
tors with the modicum of courage that Carnegie Mellon lacked.
V. CMU's POTENTIAL LIABILITY UNDER
PENNSYLVANIA OBSCENITY LAW
This Part presents a brief examination of the extreme unlikeli-
hood of success for such a specific prosecution under 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5903. When Erwin Steinberg, vice provost for edu-
cation at Carnegie Mellon, made the announcement that CMU
would be banning certain sexually explicit newsgroups from the
university's computer system, the primary reason offered was the
university's new-found fear of an obscenity prosecution."' Assess-
ment of the university's stated explanation among various com-
mentators, including computer activists, the ACLU, and CMU stu-
dents, ranged from mere honest mistake to subterfuge for elimi-
nating distasteful material on the basis of content.1" As this Note
has argued, any actual obscenity prosecution of the university
would face several constitutional difficulties and would have, at
most, an extremely small chance of ultimate success." However,
as the ACLU pointed out in its memorandum to the university,
specific aspects of the Pennsylvania obscenity law make the likeli-
hood of successful prosecution even closer to zero. '46
Pennsylvania's obscenity statute '47 prohibits any person
"knowing the obscene character of the materials ... involved""14
from, among other things, "distribut[ing] ... to any person 18
years of age or older.., any obscene materials in any man-
ner." '149 The definitional section of the statute states that "know-
ing means having general knowledge of, or reason to know or a
belief or ground for belief which warrants further inspection or
inquiry of, the character and content of any material.., which is
143. See Schackner, supra note 4, at Al.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 14-23.
145. No university anywhere in the United States has ever faced such a prosecution.
See Walszak & Heins, supra note 19.
146. See id.
147. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5903 (1994).
148. Id. § 5903(a).
149. Id. § 5903(a)(2).
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reasonably susceptible of examination by the defendant"; the statute
also uses the Miller test as the definition of "obscene." 5 ' The
"belief" language used in Pennsylvania's definition of knowledge
appears to be less protective than the Supreme Court's formula-
tion of "knowledge of the contents of the materials ... , and...
[knowledge of] the character and nature of the materials."''
However, by limiting the material in question to that "which is
reasonably susceptible of examination," the statute may actually be
more protective than the standard that the Supreme Court has
held is constitutionally required. Given that there are thousands of
continuously changing postings on the Usenet newsgroups that
CMU has restricted, it would be at least very difficult, if not im-
possible, for a prosecutor to prove that a single image or a hand-
ful of images were "reasonably susceptible of examination.' 5 2 As
was stated more generally above, the knowledge standard neces-
sary for a constitutional obscenity prosecution reduces the likeli-
hood of any such prosecution against CMU.
Furthermore, the Pennsylvania statute offers the university
another escape from criminal liability. Subsection (j) of the statute
explicitly provides the following exemption from prosecutions:
"Nothing in this section shall apply to... any library of any
school, college or university .... ."' While the university's entire
computer network may not be contained within the physical walls
of the campus library, the system is functioning in effect as an
electronic librarian, providing campus-wide access to a multitude of
resources, among which is the Usenet newsgroups.' 5 No reported
case in Pennsylvania has interpreted this exemption, so the likeli-
hood that CMU's computer system would fit the definition of
"library" is difficult to gauge. These two exemptions in the Penn-
sylvania statute offer additional reasons for CMU to abandon its
policy of censoring Usenet newsgroups.
150. Id. § 5903(b) (emphasis added).
151. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 123 (1974).
152. See Walszak & Heins, supra note 19.
153. See supra Part IV.
154. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 59036) (1994).
155. Walszak & Heins, supra note 19.
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FREE SPEECH AND THE INTERNET
CONCLUSION
For the first time since the adoption of the First Amendment,
the theoretical dream of a free marketplace for ideas has become
a reality. The Internet and the thousands of smaller computer
networks that have sprung up across the United States provide
anyone with access to a computer the opportunity to air his views
on almost any subject imaginable. This technology is still in its
infancy, but has managed to grow and thrive so far virtually un-
regulated by government, school, or business. Previously, Carnegie
Mellon University was a powerful supporter and developer of the
Internet. Every dorm on campus, and even some of the bath-
rooms, have access to the university's computer system, which in
turn provides access to the world through the Internet. Unfortu-
nately, this access was recently curtailed by university officials who
were supposedly fearful of prosecution under Pennsylvania's ob-
scenity law.
At the root of this fear is the Supreme Court's decision that
obscenity is not speech and thus is not protected by the First
Amendment. This decision, however, is bounded by the definition
of "obscenity" and by the requirements of scienter. Obscenity law
was never meant to subject the entire nation to the standards of
the most conservative jurisdiction in the country. The problem
arises because these legal doctrines were formulated in a world of
magazines, books, and film. Their application to a new technology
that is functionally without a physical "community" has the poten-
tial to put a tremendous chill on the exchange of free speech in
cyberspace and has resulted indirectly in the restriction of protect-
ed speech under the new CMU policy.
Instead of bowing to the pressure that the tension between
this new technology and old jurisprudence creates, CMU should
have demonstrated courage and a renewed support for the free-
dom of speech. Admittedly, a few of the images available on Use-
net newsgroups are offensive, disgusting, vile, and reprehensible to
the majority of Americans; however, the cost of eliminating them
places too great a burden on protected free speech and places an
intolerable limitation on the free flow of information on the
Internet. CMU's censorship is legal because of the private nature
of the institution and the university's authority to control access on
its computer system in whatever manner it so chooses. As this
Note has argued, however, the explanation that CMU officials
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have offered for this act of censorship is almost entirely base-
less."5 6 If the university officials were sincere, then their expla-
nation merely exhibits a complete lack of courage in the uni-
versity's free speech convictions. If, on the other hand, the excuse
was a subterfuge to hide a content-based reason behind the ban,
then the university deserves to be roundly condemned by any and
all true advocates of the First Amendment and free speech in the
United States.
156. One of these officials, Erwin Steinberg, recently spoke at the Frontiers of Legal
Thought Conference at Duke University School of Law. While his comments did not
represent the university's official position, Vice Provost Steinberg stated two previously
unmentioned reasons for the CMU restrictions: (1) the offensive nature of the images
and (2) a concern for the reactions of various university sources of private funds and
support. See Vice Provost Erwin R. Steinberg, Address at the Frontiers of Legal Thought
Conference (January 27, 1995) (remarks available from Carnegie Mellon University).
1182 [Vol. 44:1155
